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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a theoretical framework of the factors affecting 
the gap between the rich and the poor in the European Union, and 
utilizes a twelve-year panel (2000-2012) of 27 countries to identify 
the short-term effects of the macroeconomic performance, the level 
of household income inequality, and the social protection 
expenditure, controlling for several structural factors of income 
disparities. It is assessed their impact on the bottom, median and top 
shares of household income; it is found a different effect of the three 
core determinants before the Great Recession and during the crisis 
years, and a different public commitment depending on the type of 
welfare regime. 
 
JEL: C33, D31, I31, I32, I38. 
Keywords: European Union, Great Recession, household disposable 
income distribution, income inequality, panel models, structural 
determinants. 
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Introduction  
 
The increase of income inequality in many advanced countries has 
been widely documented (Atkinson, 1997; OECD, 2011). European 
countries are included in various international comparative studies on 
income disparities as a subset of the OECD countries (among others, 
Atkinson et al., 2005; Forster and d’Ercole, 2005; OECD, 2011); in 
analyses of the distribution of income across the world (for example, 
Deininger and Squire, 1996; Barro, 2000); or again, in studies 
concerned about specific issues on poverty or social inclusion (for 
instance, Chen and Corak (2005) deal with child poverty; Jenkins 
and Van Kerm (2006) with social mobility). Moreover, some papers 
focus on the dynamics of overall income inequality for the European 
Union taken as an aggregate, and the comparison of the whole Union 
with other selected OECD countries, for example the US (among 
others, Bonesmo Fredriksen, 2012; Dauderstadt and Kelmtek, 2011; 
Brandolini, 2007). 
However, little attention has been placed on both the extremes of 
income distribution and on the evolution of income shares for rich 
and poor households.  
An exception is represented by the debate on income polarization, 
started in the 1980s to describe the disappearance of the middle class 
(Thurow, 1984 is one of the first contribute for the US). The 
literature also focused on the methodology for the correct measure of 
polarization and the definition of aggregate indices (see, among 
others, Foster and Wolfson, 2010; Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004; 
Ytzhaki, 2010) and other more specific analyses provided evidence 
on wage polarization (Afxentiou and Kutasovic, 2011) or compared 
income disparities in the European Union on regional or micro bases 
(Ezcurra et al., 2005; Holzner, 2012). As for Europe, the study of the 
extremes of the income distribution and the related evolution of the 
income shares is rather limited. In fact, few studies considering 
                                                 
 The authors are grateful to Mariacristina Piva for valuable comments.  
This paper is part of a research project on the Economic Crisis, financed by the 
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan (D.3.2), 2012.  
The views in this paper are those of the authors. All remaining errors are our own. 
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poverty focused implicitly on the lower part of the income 
distribution (Blank, 2000) and few analyses concentrated on the top 
share and the higher tail (Atkinson et al., 2011).  
Starting from a different point of view and with a different aim, the 
recent literature on the causes of the Great Recession (GR from now 
on) has paid renewed attention on the dynamics of income inequality 
before and after the recent phenomena. In particular, there is a rising 
debate concerning the increased inequality (among others, Piketty 
and Saez, 2003) at the top of the income distribution in the last two 
decades and its role in explaining the trends of global inequality, 
before and after the crisis, especially for the US. Top incomes have 
risen in recent years also in many European countries. Nevertheless, 
their impact cannot account for the evolution of income inequality in 
Europe since the macroeconomic, institutional and policies 
differences of these countries give reason for the distinctive patterns 
of their income distribution (Alvaredo et al., 2013).  
Consequently, the characteristics of the European income 
distribution according to the structural differences existing among 
the EU countries are not completely understood. Moreover, the 
driving forces of the concentration of income at the extremes of the 
distribution are not fully investigated and, in this regard, the effects 
of the GR on these forces are still unknown.  
The aim of the paper is as follows. To understand the gap between 
the rich and the poor in the EU, an approach is adopted that assesses 
the impact of the macroeconomic performance, the degree of 
inequality, and the social public expenditure on the shares of national 
equivalised income pertaining to the extremes (and the median 
shares) of the household income distribution, controlling for 
economic, structural and social factors. The hypothesis tested is that 
the level of the macroeconomic performance, income inequality and 
social protection expenditure have affected differently the lower and 
upper tail of the income distribution over the whole period. With 
regard to this, we test the hypothesis that their impact is different 
during the years preceding the Great Recession (the so-called Great 
Moderation pre-financial crisis) and over the years of the crisis. 
Then, it is studied the impact of the social public expenditure 
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depending on the different types of welfare systems of the EU 
countries and its behaviour over the pre-crisis and crisis years.  
This analysis, studying separately the bottom part and the top tail of 
the household income distribution, allows a theoretical investigation 
of the causes of the gap between the rich and a poor and implicitly a 
more effective targeting of the policy measures for a set of countries 
that share mutual strategies of socio-economic cohesion.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, it is provided a 
theoretical analysis of the main economic, social and institutional 
causes of concentration at the tails of the household income 
distribution. It is discussed their expected effects on the EU 
countries, considering the impact of the Great Recession and the 
different welfare regimes existing among the European Union. 
Section 3 presents the data, the reasons underlying the specification 
and the econometric methodology implemented; some descriptive 
statistics are also provided. This is followed by a presentation of the 
results (Section 4) and this section discusses their theoretical 
implications. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. The theoretical framework 
 
Rising levels of inequality in the last decades have been documented 
for many developed countries (Heathcote et al., 2010) and there is 
some evidence, especially for the US, that there has also been an 
increasing disparity between the top and the bottom of income 
distribution. This evidence reinforces the need for a deeper 
understanding of the evolution of income shares at the top and at the 
bottom of the income distribution as a theoretical issue separated 
from that of income inequality or of poverty (Leigh, 2007). Along 
these lines, there are only few recent analyses for the US that want to 
research what is the impact on the actual shares of middle and/or 
low-income households, given the rise of top share (e.g. Thompson 
and Leight, 2012, find that income shares at the bottom and in the 
middle of the distribution have not risen following increases of the 
share of income held by the richest households since the 1980s).  
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The penury of analysis is considerable for Europe. There are only 
few studies on the top share of income distribution (Atkinson et al. 
2011) and on poverty (Blank, 2000), which indirectly give 
indications about the economic, social, and structural determinants of 
the concentration of income at the tails of the household income 
distribution that is the focus of our work. 
Theoretically, three are the fundamental determinants that shape the 
distribution of income: the level of economic development, income 
inequality and the social public expenditure. 
Very few studies are concerned explicitly on the impact of growth, of 
its cyclical dynamics, on the bottom tail and on the median share of 
the distribution, especially for the more recent period1. 
Understanding the impact of the macroeconomic cycle (GDP per 
capita levels; Barro, 2000) on income distributional shares for a set 
of countries, the EU, which exhibits similar institutions, may be, on 
one side, a new contribution to the literature and, on the other, may 
provide indications for inclusion policies aimed to move the EU out 
of the recent downturns.  
However, when studying the distribution of income, both the level of 
income inequality and the effect of the government redistributive 
policies are to be considered. In fact, firstly, the information given by 
the extent of the standard of living must be adjusted by the level of 
income inequality that influences the income shares held by the 
bottom and the top of the distribution and the related concentration 
of income. Secondly, households income distribution is affected by 
the government’s spending policies: different decisions about the 
amount, potential beneficiaries and characteristics by functions of the 
public expenditure can create not only fairer or less equal society but 
also more or less generous public interventions favouring the 
poorest, especially during recessive times and whenever automatic 
stabilizers are not used.  
Moreover, the concentration of income and the evolution of the 
income shares of the tails of the distribution in Europe can be related 
                                                 
1 The literature on the link between economic cycles and inequality, normally 
referred to previous recessions, can be an opportune guideline (see, between others, 
Muriel and Sibieta, 2009). This debate is developed in section 2.2. 
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to the different structural features of the labour market, to the sector 
transformation of the economy, the demographic composition, and 
the social mobility.           
Taken together, these research lines allows the identification of the 
forces shaping income inequality in Europe. Formally, our 
theoretical paradigm can be expressed as:  
 
IS = f (ECON, INEQ, EXP, STRUCT, RES)                                   (1) 
 
where IS, the chosen income share, depends on economic measures 
of the macroeconomic performance; on the prevailing income 
inequality, measured by Gini coefficient; on the social public 
expenditure towards individuals and families; on structural controls 
concerning the labour market, the population, the household structure 
and the social mobility; and on other residual factors, which can be 
specific to each country over time. 
 
1.1. Economic performance, employment and income shares 
 
According to the theoretical and empirical literature, economic 
growth is the most traditional macroeconomic determinant of 
inequality in the long run but there exists also evidence of the 
relation between business cycles, during recession times, and earning 
discrepancies.  
This last debate is important to study the impact of the recent 
downturn on income distribution in Europe2. In particular, what 
matters for our analysis is the evidence on, firstly, the link between 
macroeconomic cyclical performance and income distribution and, 
secondly, on the distributional impacts of recession on the extreme 
tails.  
                                                 
2 This brief review does not consider the long run relationship between growth and 
income distribution (therefore the wide debate on the so called Kuznets curve, 1955) 
and is not interested in the literature on the importance of previous long run 
inequality dynamics as origin of the GR, existing well documented results only for 
the US. 
10 
 
With respect to the economic performance, the main stream formal 
models relating business cycles and macroeconomic policies 
normally include the distributional characteristics of the economy as 
control (Heer, 2007; Schorfheide, 2011), but present the problem of 
modelling individuals rather than households and of taking into 
account implicitly only labour income and working age people.  
Some broad indications on the impact of the macroeconomic 
performance can be given by the decomposition analyses that 
associate different groups of individuals within the population to the 
principal source of income of their household (Jenkins et al., 2011). 
Along this reasoning, it is plausible, ceteris paribus3, that downturns 
can hit household capital incomes via a decline of stock prices and 
interest rates on financial assets and of housing values in real wealth 
and in rents. There could also be a decrease of the living standards 
for working households due to employment and pay cuts in some 
sectors of the economy. Moreover, incomes among non-employed 
households depend on the nature of changes in benefits, state 
retirement pensions and taxes used to finance them (given fiscal 
consolidation policies). If there are growing gaps between incomes 
of unemployed, rentiers, pensioners and working households, 
inequality increases (as inequality between groups is rising) and 
different effects on the tails of the distribution must be expected if 
each group of recipients is unequally represented in the income 
clusters. These effects on the overall income distribution depend also 
by the weight of the shares of each income source and the total 
impact of the economic cycle is highly ambiguous and specific for 
each country, which reinforces the need of using panel analysis in the 
empirical estimations. Additionally, there is some evidence that 
recessions can be associated with greater inequality in earnings, 
especially at the bottom for working-age households, that is 
mitigated by automatic stabilizers which reduce disposable income 
                                                 
3 Income loss as a consequence of recession or decline of living standards may lead 
people to change previous behaviors by returning to work for pensioners or rentiers, 
by moving in other regions or countries for low paid workers and unemployed, by 
sharing accommodation or returning home for younger adults. 
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inequality (Krueger et al., 2010). However, what happens to the 
whole population and to any income source is not straightforward. 
The literature on the impact of business cycles on the respective 
shares of the rich and the poor is rare and mainly on national base. 
The country usually analysed is the US and there are some studies on 
the Nordic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s (Aaberge et al., 2000) 
and on the recessions in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s (for a 
review, Parker, 1998-99). These analyses support the conclusion that 
the downturns impact strongly on the bottom of the distribution via 
an increase of unemployment that seems to be regressive. Similar 
extensions to the recent period are questionable (especially using 
panel models) and the association between business cycles and 
poverty reduction is less strong after the 1980s than in the previous 
downturns (see, Bitler and Hoynes, 2010, for the US). Thus, people 
at the bottom of the distribution do badly in recession but the extent 
depends on labour market institutions, on public safety-nets and on 
family and demographic characteristics. The analyses for the EU 
confirm this evidence since poverty is not reduced during the years 
of growth prior to the GR even if employment and average incomes 
have increased (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011).  
Cantillon (2011) justifies similar results arguing that workless 
households have not benefited of employment rise, income 
protection for working-age population out of work become less 
adequate and redistribution policies less pro-poor, given a reduction 
of income tax for top brackets. In fact, the impact of income 
protection and social redistribution in a deep downturn such as the 
GR is very important to maintain a minimum living standard to 
households at the bottom of the distribution.     
The evolution of income shares, especially during the GR, is related 
to that of labour income, the principal source for most households, 
which can adjust via changes in wages and mainly via changes in 
employment. During a recession, the latter are probably more 
important since the fall of labour demand affects primarily the 
number of people employed and the number of hours worked by 
those who have a job. These effects can act differently within 
households and can be controlled by a change in individual rates of 
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unemployment and/or by a change in jobless (in working age) 
households4. Our results are controlled for both unemployment rates 
and jobless household shares (working age people that live in 
households where no-one works) to assess the different impact of 
business cycles on the EU labour markets. 
As for the employment rates, a further dimension to control for is the 
cyclical evolution of female employment. In fact, on the one hand, 
the rise of female employment in the last decades may have reduced 
the individual earning discrepancy in EU and, on the other, it may 
have affected negatively the households labour income inequality via 
a concentration of two-career partners at the top of the distribution 
(Malerba and Spreafico, 2014).5 If the second effect prevails, the 
female employment could have a negative impact for the income 
share by poor families and a positive effect for that of the affluent 
households.  
Finally, the more recent debate (Roine et al., 2009) on the increase of 
top incomes considers the sector transformation of employment due 
in part to skill-biased evolution of the economy and to a rapid rise, 
among high-skill professions, of the financial activities in many 
developed countries. Following this evidence, we control for the 
share of the financial activities employees that can be a proxy of two 
different effects favouring the top share: first, the out-of market 
remunerations of top financial professions (individual bargaining is 
not related to labour market clearing or indirectly to the economic 
growth) with the related increase in capital gains (bankers and top 
managers, for example, had compensations related to corporate 
profits) especially before the GR and, second, the impact of 
globalization that moves low-skill jobs (more concentrated in the 
traditional manufacturing occupations) towards less developed 
countries. Hence, this sector evolution of the European economies 
                                                 
4 The changes in individual unemployment rates can be conditioned by the 
participation rates that can decline during recessions since some workers do not look 
for a new job. This effect is irrelevant if we consider the share of jobless households 
(Gregg et al., 2010). 
5 The so-called assortative match hypothesis supports this high correlation between 
partners’ income at the top of the distribution.  
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towards an increasing of the tertiary employment is expected to 
influence negatively the bottom of the distribution and positively the 
top income shares. 
In synthesis, the impact of economic performance on income shares 
at the bottom and at the top of the distribution is strongly related to 
the effects of the evolution of earning inequality in the EU, which 
basically depends on the cross-country dynamic of unemployment, 
shares of jobless households, female employment and financial 
activities employees. These control variables are indeed proxies of 
institutional, structural and social determinants of earning inequality 
since they can modify the relationship between cyclical economic 
performance and households disposable income distribution.    
 
1.2. The impact of income inequality and social mobility 
 
Recently, the literature (Perri and Steinberg, 2012) on the link 
between recessions and disposable income inequality wonders 
whether the GR can be associated with any change in unfairness 
between rich and less affluent households. The evidence is not wide 
but seems that income distribution for many OECD countries during 
the GR has changed little and that the effects could be observed in 
the long run only for the top share. In no country, in fact, there is a 
sharp change in the overall earning inequality or in either half of the 
distribution by comparing with the trends over earlier years of the 
decade (Jenkins, at al., 2011). For most of the EU countries, in the 
2000’s, the cyclical evolution of inequality is slight, given the 
structural and institutional determinants of each national trend. 
There is evidence (Barlevy and Tsiddon, 2006) that trends and cycles 
of earning inequality can be related and even if there is a technical 
distinction between the distribution of wages and disposable income, 
it is plausible to hypothesize the existence of a potential link between 
trends and cycles of disposable income as well. In particular, they 
show that the impact of recession on individual earnings inequality 
depends on the trends in inequality: recessions can be more 
equalising when inequality is not rising. The general ratio of this 
reasoning is that the contextual trends matter in considering the 
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present cyclical dynamics of inequality. Hence, the level of 
inequality in the previous period is a determinant of the evolution of 
income distribution and its dynamics affects the concentration of top 
and bottom income shares. 
When considering bottom and top shares, social mobility and the 
relationship between income inequality and equality of opportunities 
ought to be taken into account. There is a well-known phenomenon, 
called Great Gatsby curve, which suggests that there exists a cross-
country inverse link between income inequality and social mobility 
at least in the long run. Some studies (Chetty et al., 2014) found for 
the US that, social mobility has not changed in the last decades even 
if income inequality has increased. This evidence is probably due to 
a reduction of discriminations by gender and race mainly in 
education and labour market participation, whereas the increasing 
share of income going to the top 1 percent could instead have 
reduced the opportunities to the rest of the income ladders to 
moderate the existing gap with the elite. Barriers due to individual 
discrimination may be low even in the EU, where social class 
immobility is more related to strong links between family 
generations, via the transmission of wealth, to social background and 
professional status.  
Along this reasoning, social mobility can be interpreted as 
intergenerational mobility, due to the relationships among family 
members, mainly via education and wealth transmission. Thus, the 
impact of inequality on income shares is controlled, on the one hand, 
for the levels of tertiary education attainments and, on the other, for 
the proportion of housing ownership.  
The expansion of higher education matters for the equalisation of 
educational opportunities (Breen and Jonsson, 2007), and over the 
last century, most European countries, have certainly experienced a 
general increase in the average level of schooling. In general terms, 
if on the whole the proportion of people entering the educational 
system increases, more people from less favourable backgrounds are 
likely to enter too, thus reducing the gap with more advantaged 
people.  
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Secondly, equal opportunities are related to wealth transmission. 
Although good statistics for estimating the effects of wealth on 
income inequality are hard to find, some indication of the potential 
partial effect can be given by information about housing tenure 
(Norris and Winston, 2012). In fact, home ownership is a widespread 
component of population wealth in many countries and it varies 
widely across Europe, since the choice to live in a house as owner is 
strongly related to institutions and cultural traditions, which are 
country specific.6 Among the national distinctive patterns, it can be 
included the wealth transmission (via bequests and inheritances) 
between family generations that is likely to contribute to maintain the 
distances between social classes.7 The more widespread the housing 
ownership, the more influential the family transmission. 
 
1.3. Welfare regimes and Government commitments 
 
In general, the literature gives support to the positive impact of 
welfare generosity and social spending on both income inequality 
and poverty in Europe (Jenkins et al., 2011). However, the influence 
of governments’ commitment towards income distribution is less 
documented. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by considering 
not only the role of the social public spending on the shares of 
income held by the poor and the rich but also assessing its effects 
depending on the different types of the EU welfare regimes and the 
period studied.  
Disposable income is known to decrease more smoothly than GDP 
during recession time. The reason is that public intervention, 
especially in Europe, plays a key role to mitigate the effects of 
                                                 
6 It is implicitly assumed that financial wealth accumulation is more similar across 
Europe than it is for property wealth.  
7 Picketty (2011), for example, estimates an increase in the inheritance flows as 
percentage of disposable income in France in the last three decades and the same 
evolution can be inferred for other EU countries as well. This process is important in 
those countries where the wealth accumulation is relatively higher and there are 
diffused preferences towards wealth transmission between generations.    
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downturns: without the support of tax and benefit systems, the 
household income would have fallen dramatically.8   
Statistics on social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
show on average an increase in social public spending in Europe, 
especially after the 2007.9 This in part reflects the effects of 
automatic stabilizers (unemployment benefits is the more diffused 
example) and in part the impact of economic stimulus packages used 
discretionally by governments which normally include also more 
generous monetary transfers to individuals and families in needs or 
temporary cash benefits for people in working age not entitled to 
unemployment benefits.10 The impact of public commitment on 
disposable income is not homogenous and is normally related to the 
different levels of effectiveness of welfare state regimes. 
Traditionally, in Europe, we have at least four different regimes of 
welfare state. These are: the Social Democratic (Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands and Sweden), the Conservative-corporatist (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), the Liberal (Ireland 
and United Kingdom) and the Southern European (Cyprus, Greece, 
Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) systems, which are characterized by 
different combinations of taxes and benefits and by different 
collective preferences concerning the universal targeting of the 
                                                 
8 Our analysis employs statistics of equivalised household disposable income to 
define income shares. Hence, we are implicitly considering, on the one hand, some 
dimensions of family composition (via equivalence scales) and, on the other, the 
redistributive effects of taxes and benefits on gross incomes. The only available 
statistics for all the EU countries are on disposable income and thus they include 
monetary benefits (mainly social security benefits) and exclude taxes and 
employees’ social security contributions. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that some 
sort of redistribution has already been achieved via taxation and cash benefits. 
Furthermore, as we are using a monetary definition of income, data on income in 
kind, including free benefits from public services such as health, primary education 
and child care services that are not supplied in cash, are not considered.  
9 The overall average raises from 15.50% to 17.24% after 2007.  
Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics. 
10 Unemployment benefits have normally a defined duration (often related to the 
duration of the previous employment status) and in some countries the length of the 
coverage has been extended to avoid a reduction of living standard for workers less 
protected or less involved in the labour participation.  
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recipients.11 More generally, in the traditional debate on the 
European welfare states (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), the 
effectiveness of public social policies in reducing inequality and 
poverty depends, on the one hand, on the opportune balance between 
cash transfers (normally means-tested) and in-kind benefits (mainly 
universal services) and, on the other, on the correct targeting 
mechanisms of the transfers (or tax reductions) for specific groups of 
the population. 
A share of at least 20% of total household income in many EU 
countries is not due to labour and/or capital incomes. Rather, it 
consists of government transfers, mainly benefits for the elderly, as 
revealed by many official statistics (Eurostat, 2011; Eurostat, 2013). 
In fact, the main monetary resources of the elderly in Europe consist 
of public pensions, since private pensions are virtually non-existent, 
with a few notable exceptions (for example, the Anglo-Saxon 
regime). Thus, a large share of public benefits is designated for old 
people, especially if social insurance contributions are not well 
calibrated. This represents one of the most important channels of 
redistributive intervention between groups across EU countries.12 
Since it is not possible to exclude public pensions from social 
expenditure13, the effect on the income shares of social public 
spending is controlled for the share of elderly people (65 years and 
above) in each country. The impact of this variable is expected to be 
strong on the top and the bottom of the distribution but as the result 
                                                 
11 Following Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2013), this distinction comes from the 
work of Esping-Andersen (1990) and the study of the features of the welfare systems 
in Southern Europe (Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996; Petmesidou 1996). 
12 An OECD recent analysis (2011) shows that in the last two decades the share of 
“non-elderly” benefits has declined in the overall public social expenditure. 
Spending on non-elderly benefits tend to be less cyclical than other social 
expenditures, even if the latter include unemployment benefits that follow growth 
patterns (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). 
13 Due to the lack of statistics on the share of pension benefits for all the countries 
and the period covered by this study, it is not possible to exclude such component of 
public transfers from social expenditure. In the recent literature, there are few 
analyses only for the EU-15 countries over a shorter period (i.e., Dafermos and 
Papatheodorou, 2013).  
18 
 
of different determinants. If welfare state regimes are more generous 
with elderly people, the share of elderly people produces, on one 
hand, a reduction of the bottom share, mainly via a less redistributive 
social expenditure towards other households, and on the other an 
increase of the top share of the distribution. Such increase is 
probably related to the earning age profiles that produce higher 
labour incomes for older workers (and more generous pension 
schemes). Even capital income from investments is normally more 
concentrated for older households due to the increasing concentration 
of wealth during maturity age in many countries.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We used a data set of twenty-seven EU member states14 over the 
2000-2012 period. The gap between the rich and the poor is 
quantified by the shares of national equivalised income held by 
different quantiles in each country in a specific year.15 In particular, 
the first and second deciles are considered to catch the bottom of the 
income distribution, the fifth and the eighth to look at the boundaries 
of a sort of middle class, whereas the tenth decile and the hundredth 
percentile to capture the top and the richest part of it. 16 All these are 
the dependent variables of our empirical specification since the study 
of neighbouring parts of the income distribution may display on the 
one hand a different impact of the supposed determinants and on the 
other may act as a robustness check of the estimated results. 
                                                 
14 These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Croatia is excluded 
from the dataset due to missing statistics for several variables. 
15 Data are not available for every year. Data Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Statistics 
Database. 
16 These are noncumulative shares.   
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Table 1 shows the average shares over the studied period of the 
national equivalised income held by the first, second, fifth, eighth, 
tenth deciles and the hundredth percentile in the EU countries 
classified, according to the literature, by the type of welfare system.  
  
Table 1 - Average shares of national equivalised income over 
the 2000-2012 period 
 
 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
5th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
100th 
percentile 
SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC       
Denmark 2.91 5.98 8.91 12 20.83 4.76 
Finland 4.06 5.64 8.52 11.84 21.81 4.95 
Netherlands 3.55 5.85 8.43 11.82 22.16 4.77 
Sweden 3.6 5.95 8.95 12.08 19.74 3.65 
CONSERVATIVE 
CORPORATIST       
Austria 3.73 5.67 8.49 11.93 21.77 4.18 
Belgium 3.48 5.47 8.58 12.17 21.64 4.69 
Germany 3.2 5.31 8.37 11.97 23.08 5.11 
France 3.63 5.34 8.16 11.71 24.13 5.4 
Luxembourg 3.63 5.41 8.31 11.99 22.46 4.44 
LIBERAL       
Ireland 3.33 4.91 8 12.26 24.16 5.52 
United Kingdom 2.76 4.71 7.78 12.1 25.91 6.08 
SOUTHERN 
EUROPEAN       
Cyprus 3.58 5.1 8.13 11.93 23.98 5.73 
Greece 2.3 4.47 7.93 12.46 25.38 5.43 
Italy 2.51 4.72 8.12 12.33 24.42 5.13 
Malta 3.62 5.37 8.41 12.32 21.61 3.87 
Portugal 2.67 4.33 7.38 11.77 28.4 5.96 
Spain 1.98 4.51 8.16 12.82 23.84 4.14 
EASTERN       
Bulgaria 2.4 4.28 7.94 12.42 25.6 5.5 
Czech Republic 4.13 5.98 8.45 11.63 21.86 4.58 
Estonia  2.65 4.65 7.8 12.51 24.88 4.73 
Hungary 3.75 5.55 8.46 11.86 22.3 4.68 
Latvia 2.13 4.05 7.47 12.56 27.4 5.62 
Lithuania 2.36 4.33 7.71 12.41 26.02 5.05 
Poland 2.88 4.7 7.95 12.18 25.06 5.11 
Romania 2.13 4.05 7.93 12.8 25.26 4.8 
Slovenia 3.98 5.93 8.85 12.03 19.66 3.28 
Slovakia 3.67 5.83 8.58 11.92 21.27 4.38 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics: dependent variables 
 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Observationsa
First  
decile    
   
 Overall 3.1891 .6921 1.3 4.2 N = 257   
 Between  .6472 2.1333 4.1375   n = 27 
 Within  .3048 1.6791 4.0791 T-bar = 9.518 
Second 
decile       
 Overall 5.1478 .6499 3.6 6.2  N = 257 
 Between  .6522 4.05 5.9875 n = 27 
 Within  .1953 4.4978 5.6978 T-bar = 9.518 
Fifth  
decile       
 Overall 8.2357 .4398 7 9.2 N = 257   
 Between  .4076 7.4090 8.9555 n = 27 
 Within  .1915 7.6732 9.1448 T-bar = 9.518 
Eighth 
decile       
 Overall 12.1354 .3507 11 13.2 N = 257   
 Between  .3065 11.6375 12.8 n = 27 
 Within  .1919 11.0770 12.6808 T-bar = 9.518 
Tenth 
decile       
 Overall 23.3894 2.3764 19 30.3 N = 257   
 Between  2.2151 19.6625 28.3272 n = 27 
 Within  1.0246 21.2644 28.4894 T-bar = 9.518 
Hundredth 
percentile       
 Overall 4.8679 .9247 3 7.8 N = 231   
 Between  .6858 3.2875 6.0875 n = 27 
 Within  .6366 3.6457 7.9804 T-bar = 8.555 
a: N is the number of observations; n, the number of countries; T-bar, the average 
time periods 
 
In general terms, considering the tails of the income distribution, it is 
worth noting that the Nordic and the Central European countries 
display the highest shares of income held by the poorest (first and 
second deciles) and the lowest shares held by the richest (tenth 
decile). The reverse is true for Southern European and Eastern 
countries. Some EU members deserve attention. Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia are the more egalitarian countries 
compare both to their group and the whole sample: the average 
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shares held by the bottom part (first and second deciles) and the top 
part (tenth decile) of the income distribution are consistent with the 
Nordic group, particularly Finland. The more unequal countries are 
United Kingdom, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the other Eastern 
countries: they present, on average, low shares of income held by the 
poor and high shares held by the rich. Concerning the richest, the top 
1 percent, a same ranking can be found. The grater shares are those 
of the Liberal group (Ireland and United Kingdom), the Southern 
European (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Portugal) and the Eastern set 
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). 
On the whole, as to the tails of the income distribution, between and 
within group of countries belonging to the same welfare state regime, 
there exists a substantial disparity, whereas, as to the median share 
and the upper-middle class, countries are less dissimilar. 
This evidence can be confirmed if the descriptive statistics are 
considered (Table 2). Every variable exhibits a between standard 
deviation considerably higher than the within one. This means that 
the difference in terms of inequality between these countries is 
greater than the longitudinal variation each of them has experienced. 
This is indeed why EU institutions have been placing for several 
years great emphasis on economic and social cohesion policies and 
emphasizing the aims of raising the standard of living and the quality 
of life of all citizens throughout the Union for the present decade. 
 
The fundamental determinants of a country’s income distribution are 
the level of economic development, its macroeconomic performance, 
the level of income inequality and the government’s commitment 
towards redistributive policies. The macroeconomic performance is 
measured by the GDP per head (expressed in logarithmic terms).17 
The state of income disparity is assessed by the Gini coefficient18, 
which measures the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
                                                 
17 GDP per capita PPP constant 2005 international $. Data Source: World 
Development Indicators Database 
18 Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income. Data Source: Eurostat, EU-
SILC Statistics Database 
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perfectly equal distribution and thus ‘adjusts’ what the GDP per head 
tells. Government intervention is measured by the general 
government social protection expenditure expressed as a percentage 
of GDP.19  
Following the theoretical discussion (Section 2), their effect is 
controlled for several dimensions concerning the labour market, the 
social mobility and the demographic and households structure. 
As for the labour market, the impact of the economic cycle (GDP per 
head) on income shares is controlled for the dynamics of earning 
inequality which depends on the total unemployment rate (20-64 
years), the share of people (aged 18-59) that live in households 
where no-one works (people jobless hh), the rate of female 
employment (20-64 years) and the share of the employees (25-64 
years) of the financial services sector (financial activities 
employees).20 Concerning social mobility, thought in terms of 
intergenerational mobility, the effect of inequality on income shares 
is controlled for the percentage of people (aged 25-64) with tertiary 
education attainment and for the distribution of population owning 
the house (housing ownership)21. To take into account the dynamics 
of the population, which matters for the social protection policies, the 
impact of the government’s expenditure is controlled for the share of 
elderly people (aged 65 and above).22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Data Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics 
20 Data Source: Eurostat, Labour Market Statistics Database (EU-SILC, Labour 
Force Survey) 
Concerning the employees of the financial services sector, the share is the ratio 
between the number of the people employed in the ‘financial and insurance 
activities’ sector  and the number of people employed in ‘All NACE activities’ 
sector. 
21 Data Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Statistics Database 
22 Data Source: Data Source: World Development Indicators Database 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics: independent variables 
 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max Observationsa
(ln) GDP per 
head       
 Overall 10.064   .450   8.830   11.212 N = 351 
 Between  .445  9.156   11.113 n = 27 
 Within  .106   9.671  10.351          T-bar =13 
Gini Index       
 Overall 29.326   4.028    22 39.2 N = 303 
 Between  3.771   23.008  36.355 n = 27 
 Within  1.659   23.356   36.276    T-bar=11.222 
Social 
Protection 
Expenditure 
      
 Overall 16.178   4.138    7.9    25.3 N = 349 
 Between  3.926  10.092  23.646 n = 27 
 Within  1.467   12.478   21.124   T-bar =12.925 
Housing 
Owner        
 Overall 57.428   9.6591    42 91 N = 284 
 Between  10.102  44.133    86.725 n = 27 
 Within  2.660   48.069   72.528   T-bar =10.518 
People  
jobless hh       
 Overall 9.458   2.567    4.4    17.7 N = 336 
 Between  2.069   5.453   13.453 n = 27 
 Within  1.535   5.004   17.027   T-bar =12.444 
Tertiary 
Education       
 Overall 23.738   8.240    5.4    42.4 N = 347 
 Between  7.593   11.738    35.5 n = 27 
 Within  3.448   11.569  37.038   T-bar =12.851 
Unemployment       
 Overall 8.110   4.090    1.7    24.5 N = 351 
 Between  3.125   3.261   14.515 n = 27 
 Within  2.700   .625   20.841          T-bar =13 
Female 
employment       
 Overall 61.556   8.707    32.7    77.2 N = 351 
 Between  8.458   37.492   76.138 n = 27 
 Within  2.593    53.079   70.863          T-bar =13 
Financial 
activities 
employees 
      
 Overall 3.148   2.027   .876   13.370 N = 349 
 Between  2.034   1.207   11.707 n = 27 
 Within  .322   1.653   4.810   T-bar =12.925 
Elderly people       
 Overall 15.713   2.329    10.228   21.100 N = 351 
 Between  2.237    10.958   19.642 n = 27 
 Within  .767  12.929   18.039          T-bar =13 
a: N is the number of observations; n, the number of countries; T-bar, the average 
time periods 
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Table (3) displays the descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables. On the whole, the between standard deviation of each 
variable is higher than the within one. This difference is considerable 
if the housing ownership, the rate of female employment, the tertiary 
education, the employees of the financial activities sector, and the 
percentage of old people are considered, which confirms the 
‘structural’ heterogeneity existing among the EU-members. 
 
2.2. The econometric specification 
 
Consistent with the theoretical argument, we specified the following 
equation model: 
 
    	


    
 !"  











#$  %  &  '                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where  are the share of national equivalised income held by the 
quantiles studied23, $ is the vector of the control variables. To 
avoid endogeneity problems, the three core independent variables 
and the controls are specified at time t-1:  this procedure estimates 
the impact that all the hypothesized determinants at time t-1 have on 
the quantile’s share of national income at time t. 
The model attempts to explain the income distribution in terms of the 
measures of economic performance, income inequality and 
government’s social protection expenditure, controlling 
progressively for the other variables, whereas time dummies (&) 
and country-group dummies (%) are added to all regressions to 
control further the estimation results. Country-group dummies may 
account of any economic and political heterogeneity across them. 
These are defined on the basis of the different welfare regimes the 
EU countries have (Section 2.3).24  
                                                 
23 First, second, fifth, eighth, tenth deciles and hundredth percentile. 
24 According to the literature, fifth types of welfare systems can be defined. Thus, 
the first group dummy is formed by the Social Democratic (SD) countries; the 
second, by the Conservative-corporatist (CC) countries; the third, by the Liberal 
25 
 
 
The model specification was estimated through different estimation 
techniques.25 
Firstly, pooled ordinary least squared (POLS) regressions were run to 
provide preliminary reference evidence. Although very basic, these 
POLS regressions were controlled for heteroskedasticity (we used 
the Eicker/Huber/White sandwich estimator to compute robust 
standard errors) and for a complete set of two batteries of dummies, 
namely time and country-group dummies (Tables B.1 and B.2, 
Appendix B). 
Secondly, since preliminary tests with this model indicate the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and within panel AR(1) 
autocorrelation26, feasible generalized least squares regressions were 
run in order to provide reliable estimate results (Wooldridge, 2002) 
controlled (as before) for the entire batteries of dummies (Tables 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and Table C.1 of Appendix C). We will consider them in 
Section 4 that is devoted to discuss the econometrics results. 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
 
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 927 report the estimated impact of the 
macroeconomic performance, the level of income disparity and the 
                                                                                                       
(LIB) countries; the fourth, by the Southern European (SE) countries; the fifth, by 
the Eastern (EAST) ones. In the specified model, the latter is the excluded category. 
25 As briefly said before (footnote 2), the original panel is unbalanced. To study 
whether the core regressors had a different impact before the Great Recession and 
during the crisis years (Section 4), we needed to complete the dataset to have a 
sufficient number of observations. We used simple moving average between 
available observations or the latest available one. This procedure does not distort the 
series even that with the fewest observations. In fact, as Tables A.1 and A.2 
(Appendix A) show, the values of the between and within standard deviation for the 
“balanced” series are in line with those unbalanced. Moreover, general model 
regressions (POLS and FGLS) were run over the unbalanced sample showing that 
the estimates of the balanced case are consistent with those unbalanced. 
26 Drukker, 2003; Im et al., 2003; Levin et al., 2002 
27 Table C.1 (Appendix C) reports the FGLS estimates of the model run over the 
unbalanced sample. 
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government’s social protection policies, controlling for the two 
batteries of dummies and progressively for the other controls.  
Turning first to Tables 4 and 5, which studies the bottom of the 
income distribution, the lower tail, it can be noticed that economic 
development (GDP per head) and the social protection expenditure 
affect positively (it is statistically significant when the percentage of 
elderly people is controlled for, columns i and j) the share of national 
equivalised income held by the first (the poorest) and the second 
deciles, while the level of income inequality (Gini coefficient) has a 
negative effect. This evidence shows that the higher the level of per 
capita GDP and government’s social protection expenditure, the 
lower the degree of income inequality, the higher is the share of 
income held by the poor. 
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All the other regressors take the expected sign. In particular, the 
rate of unemployment and the percentage of people in jobless 
households affect negatively the share of income held by the first 
decile (Table 4, column j), whereas they are not statistically 
significant when the second decile is considered (Table 5, column 
j). The share of employees of the financial activities sector affects 
negatively both parts of the income distribution (Tables 4 and 5, 
columns j), whereas the rate of female employment has a 
significant effect only on the share of income held by the second 
decile of households. Concerning social mobility, the estimated 
coefficient of housing ownership is positive and statistically 
significant for both groups when it is added alone and in the 
general specification (Tables 4 and 5, columns c and j); whereas, 
the percentage of people with tertiary education attainment is no 
statistically significant in the general specification (Tables 4 and 5, 
columns j). It is worth noting that this regressor displays a negative 
and statistically significant sign when added alone (Tables 4 and 5, 
columns e), suggesting that there is no equalisation of educational 
opportunities as people from disadvantaged backgrounds are less 
likely to enter the tertiary educational system. Finally, the 
proportion of elderly people affects negatively the bottom part of 
the income distribution due to less redistributive social 
expenditures towards other households. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 display the regression results when the share of 
national income held by the median part and the eighth decile of 
the income distribution are considered. These constitute the 
boundaries of a sort of middle class and separate the bottom tail 
and the top tail of the income distribution.  
These regression results matter for two reasons. Firstly, they show 
the part of the income distribution  from where the impact of the 
core determinants changes. Secondly, they constitute a benchmark 
and a robustness check with respect to the tails of the distribution. 
Turning first to Table 6, GDP per head affects positively the 
dependent variable, the magnitude of its coefficient is smaller than 
previous cases. Gini coefficient has a negative impact, whereas 
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social expenditure a positive effect. The other regressors, when 
statistically significant, take the expected sign. In particular, the 
rate of unemployment, the rate of female employment, the share of 
the employees of the financial activities sector and the percentage 
of old people affect negatively the income held by the median part 
of the income distribution.  
 
As far as the eighth decile is concerned, the signs of the three core 
regressors are just the reverse. Both GDP per head (with the lowest 
significance level) and the social protection expenditure have a 
negative impact. The Gini coefficient has a positive effect. This 
evidence shows that the lower the level of economic development, 
the lower the social protection expenditure, the higher the level of 
income disparity, the lower is the share of national equivalised 
income held by the eighth decile.  
The social mobility proxies deserve some comments (columns c, e 
and j). The estimated impacts of housing ownership and the 
percentage of people with tertiary education attainments have a 
opposite impact compared to that on the bottom part of the income 
distribution. The higher the proportion of the population owing the 
house, the lower the share of income held by the upper-middle 
class. The higher the percentage of people with tertiary education, 
the higher the share of income held by the eighth decile. This 
strengthens the idea that equalisation of educational opportunities 
has not been achieved. 
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The last two tables (Tables 8 and 9) show what happens when the 
top (tenth decile) and the richest part (hundredth percentile) of the 
income distribution is studied. Both specifications exhibits a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for GDP per head 
and a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the Gini 
coefficient, which however displays a lower magnitude when the 
hundredth percentile is the quantile considered. Social protection 
public expenditure carries a negative sign and it is significant at a 
modest significance level only when the share of income held by 
the tenth decile is the dependent variable.  
Housing ownership does not affect the top part of the income 
distribution, whereas tertiary education affects negatively the 
income of the rich showing that the access to the highest level of 
education redistributes only on behalf of the median and upper- 
class. The rate of  female employment and the share of employees 
of the financial activities sector have a positive effect on the 
income held by the top tail. This confirms, on the one hand, the so-
called ‘assortative mating’ hypothesis; on the other, the effect of 
the out-of market remunerations of top financial professions and 
the impact of globalization that is moving low-skill jobs (more 
concentrated in manufacturing) towards less developed countries. 
Finally, with respect to the bottom tail, it is worth noting that the 
percentage of old people affect positively the top part of the 
income distribution.  
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Starting from the whole sample estimates, which are the reference 
evidence for the following analyses, we investigate firstly whether 
or not the estimated impact of the core regressors has changed over 
time. Secondly, whether the social protection expenditure has a 
different profile depending on the different welfare regimes and the 
period considered.  
Turning to the first issue, the econometric specification at (1) is run 
over two different time periods. Studying the behaviour of the time 
dummies (namely, when the magnitude of the coefficients and their 
significance levels vary) that reveal that a break occurred at 2007 
and considering that the regressors are specified at time t-1, we 
split the sample at 2007 and identify the 2000-2007 interval as the 
pre-crisis period and the 2008-2012 interval as the Great Recession 
period.  
Tables 10 and 11 present the regression results.  
During the 2000-2007 interval, GDP per head is always 
statistically significant and displays the expected sign consistent 
with the above discussion. The Gini Index is highly statistically 
significant with negative sign for the bottom and median shares; it 
affects positively the upper-middle class and the top tail. It has no 
effect during the pre-crisis years. The social protection expenditure 
is statistically significant at considerable levels for the poor, the 
rich and the median share. It has a minor impact on the top 1 
percent. This means that before the Great Recession, redistribution 
went from the tenth decile to the first part of the income 
distribution and the redistributive policies were progressive 
towards the poor and less advantaged households. 
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Table 10 - GLS regressions. General model estimation  over 2000-2007 
 
 1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8thdecile 10th decile 100
th 
percentile 
GDP 
 per headt-1 
1.6392***   
(.1989) 
1.3801***   
(.1626) 
.4874***   
(.0781) 
-.3130***    
(.1069) 
-3.9324***   
(.5563) 
-.9946***   
(.3427) 
Ginit-1 
-.0318***    
(.0108) 
-.0550***   
(.0085) 
-.0761***   
(.0055) 
.0272***    
(.0050) 
.3979***   
(.0330) 
.0250    
(.0209) 
Social 
Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0525***   
(.0159) 
.0408***   
(.0119) 
.0366***   
(.0082) 
-.0053    
(.0086) 
-.1547***   
(.0496) 
-.0583*   
 (.0325) 
Ownert-1 
.0101**    
(.0044) 
.0068**   
(.0034) 
.0019   
(.0020) 
.0012   
(.0022) 
-.0143   
(.0112) 
-.0119   
 (.0089) 
People jobless  
hht-1 
.0193   
(.0235) 
.0112   
(.0192) 
.0082   
(.0131) 
.0099   
(.0140) 
-.0904   
(.0871) 
.0822    
(.0551) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0062   
(.0039) 
-.0011   
(.0039) 
.0094***    
(.0031) 
.0035   
(.0027) 
-.0682***   
(.0163) 
-.0190**   
(.0095) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0205*   
(.0115) 
-.0118   
(.0105) 
-.0107*   
(.0064) 
-.0106   
(.0071) 
.1046***   
(.0392) 
-.0009   
 (.0284) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0018   
(.0058) 
-.0116**   
(.0046)     
-.0095***   
(.0031) 
-.0096**   
(.0038) 
.0895***   
(.0199) 
.0549***   
(.0138) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.1494***   
(.0272) 
-.1045***    
(.0222) 
-.0610***   
(.0145) 
.0018   
(.0178) 
.4179***   
(.0678) 
.1252**   
(.0499) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.1503***   
(.0248) 
-.0845***   
(.0195) 
-.0302***   
(.0109) 
.0210    
(.0129) 
.2122***   
(.0640) 
.0899*    
(.0537) 
SD 
-.0061***   
(.0020) 
-.0031**   
(.0013) 
-.0024***   
(.0008) 
.0014   
(.0012) 
.0215***   
(.0056) 
.0065    
(.0049) 
CC 
-.0049***   
(.0016) 
-.0066***   
(.0012) 
-.0029***   
(.0007) 
.0005   
(.0010) 
.0217***   
(.0044) 
.0043     
(.0038) 
LIB 
-.0096***   
(.0022) 
-.0102***   
(.0018) 
-.0018*   
(.0011) 
.0011   
(.0015) 
.0247***    
(.0071) 
.0131**   
(.0054) 
SE 
-.0042***   
(.0012) 
-.0068***   
(.0010) 
-.0002   
(.0006) 
.0016*   
(.0009) 
.0119***   
(.0037) 
.0079***   
(.0028) 
constant 
-.1038***    
(.0213) 
-.0543***   
(.0177) 
.0600***   
(.0081) 
.1459***   
(.0112) 
.4521***   
(.0606) 
.0994***   
(.0376) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Wald GDP per 
headt-1 
(p-value) 
67.89*** 
(0.000) 
71.99*** 
(0.000) 
38.92*** 
(0.000) 
8.56*** 
(0.003) 
49.96*** 
(0.000) 
8.42*** 
(0.003) 
Wald Ginit-1 
(p-value) 
8.64*** 
(0.003) 
41.42*** 
(0.000) 
189.93*** 
(0.000) 
28.89*** 
(0.000) 
145.30***      
(0.000) 
1.43       
(0.231) 
Wald Social 
Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
(p-value) 
10.89*** 
(0.001) 
11.61*** 
(0.000) 
19.77*** 
(0.000) 
0.37 
(0.5404) 
9.70*** 
(0.001) 
3.21* 
(0.073) 
       
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Wald test p-
value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
For the three core regressors, Wald test of significance are also reported. 
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Table 11 - GLS regressions. General model estimation over 2008-2012 
 
 1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 100
th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
.3800  
(.2319) 
.4561***   
(.1409) 
.2650*   
(.1361) 
-.3681**   
(.1811) 
-1.5161**   
(.7535) 
-.5571    
(.5196) 
Ginit-1 
-.0839***   
(.0112) 
-.1072***   
(.0066) 
-.0705***   
(.0066) 
.0081   
(.0082) 
.4637***   
(.0370) 
.1413***   
(.0241) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0361***   
(.0138) 
.0135*   
(.0079) 
-.0076   
(.0091) 
-.0333***   
(.0100) 
.1260***   
(.0417) 
.1018***   
(.0280) 
Ownert-1 
.0098***   
(.0031) 
.0043*   
(.0024) 
-.0011   
(.0024) 
-.0100***   
(.0030) 
.0236**   
(.0120) 
.0153    
(.0094) 
People jobless  
hht-1 
-.0723***   
(.0235) 
-.0467***   
(.0151) 
.0437***   
(.0143) 
.0114   
(.0182) 
-.2132***   
(.0673) 
-.0740   
 (.0488) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0024   
(.0057) 
-.0076**   
(.0033) 
-.0015   
(.0036) 
.0223***   
(.0058) 
-.0062   
(.0159) 
.0063   
 (.0123) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0089   
(.0115) 
.0129   
(.0079) 
-.0136*   
(.0079) 
-.0063   
(.0090) 
.0778**   
(.0394) 
.0097    
(.0286) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
.0054   
(.0072) 
-.0035    
(.0039) 
-.0011   
(.0036) 
-.0147**   
(.0067) 
.0168   
(.0177) 
.0043    
(.0146) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.0591***   
(.0223) 
-.0437**   
(.0179) 
-.0246   
(.0174) 
.0411*   
(.0235) 
.1014   
(.0985) 
.0298    
(.0782) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.0741***   
(.0142) 
-.0195*   
(.0114) 
-.0004   
(.0114) 
.0475***   
(.0144) 
-.0035   
(.0607) 
-.0383    
(.0432) 
SD 
-.0029   
(.0018) 
.0018*   
(.0010) 
.0007   
(.0011) 
-.0011   
(.0015) 
.0021   
(.0057) 
.0037     
 (.0038) 
CC 
.0004   
(.0014) 
-.0007   
(.0008) 
-.0008   
(.0008) 
-.0008   
(.0013) 
.0056   
(.0047) 
.0056*    
(.0034) 
LIB 
-.0004   
(.0019) 
.0003   
(.0012) 
-.0036***   
(.0011) 
-.0004   
(.0017) 
.0200***   
(.0070) 
.0096*    
(.0056) 
SE 
-.0024**   
(.0009) 
-.0027***   
(.0007) 
-.0002   
(.0006) 
.0002   
(.0011) 
.0046   
(.0036) 
.0035    
(.0030) 
constant 
.0258   
(.0271) 
.0445***   
(.0146) 
.0778***   
(.0133) 
.1621***   
(.0200) 
.2124***   
(.0781) 
.0399    
(.0533) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Wald GDP per 
headt-1 
(p-value) 
2.68 
(0.101) 
10.48*** 
(0.001) 
3.79*     
(0.051) 
4.13** 
(0.042) 
4.05** 
(0.044) 
1.15 
(0.283) 
Wald Ginit-1 
(p-value) 
55.87*** 
(0.000) 
259.10*** 
(0.000) 
111.90*** 
(0.000) 
0.97 
(0.324) 
156.48*** 
(0.000) 
34.33*** 
(0.000) 
Wald Social 
Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
(p-value) 
6.85*** 
(0.008) 
2.86* 
(0.090) 
0.70 
(0.403) 
11.04*** 
(0.000) 
9.11*** 
(0.002) 
13.17*** 
(0.000) 
       
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Wald test  
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
For the three core regressors, Wald test of significance are also reported. 
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During the crisis years (2008-2007), GDP per head is fully 
statistically significant only when the share held by the second 
decile is the dependent variable. Also the Gini coefficient behave 
as expected. With respect to the pre-crisis period, it plays no role 
for the share of income held by the eighth decile, whereas it has a 
significant effect for the richest part of the distribution. The social 
protection public expenditure deserves attention. It affects 
positively both the lowest part of the income distribution (first 
decile at considerable significance level) and the highest part (tenth 
decile and hundredth percentile). It affects negatively only the 
share of income held by the eighth decile. This means that, 
contrary to any expectation, social expenditure during the Great 
Recession period has been regressive on behalf of the rich. If any 
redistribution has occurred, this has been supported by the upper-
middle class. 
 
The evidence gained about the different impact of the social 
protection expenditure over the two time periods (Tables 10 and 
11) suggests to analyze whether the social protection expenditure 
has had a different profile depending on the different welfare 
regimes existing across the European Union. 
Hence, in the last tables (Tables 12 and 13), we test for slope 
differences and proceed with the same models as before except 
interaction terms for the social protection expenditure variable and 
the country-group dummies are included.  
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Table 12 - GLS regressions. Social expenditure and institutional systems 
over 2000-2007 
 1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 100
th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
1.8126***   
(.2022) 
1.6924***    
(.1617) 
.7294***   
(.0987) 
-.2118*   
(.1171) 
-5.5830***   
(.6370) 
-1.1651***   
(.3948) 
Ginit-1 
-.0281***   
(.0107) 
-.0494***   
(.0088) 
-.0706***   
(.0055) 
.0283***     
(.0050) 
.3237***   
(.0344) 
.0119    
(.0209) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0519**   
(.0215)   
.0186   
(.0163) 
.0047    
(.0125) 
-.0351***   
(.0132) 
.0323   
(.0796) 
-.0094    
(.0520) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SD 
.0119   
(.0346) 
.0230   
(.0173) 
.0602***   
(.0152) 
.0630***   
(.0181) 
-.2893***   
(.0975) 
-.2201***   
(.0777) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
CC 
.0240   
(.0515) 
.1376***   
(.0402) 
.1408***   
(.0327) 
.0393   
(.0291) 
-.5982***   
(.1569) 
-.1517    
(.1074) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
LIB 
.1297***   
(.0447) 
.1225***   
(.0335) 
-.0030   
(.0372) 
.0246   
(.0406) 
-.3786**   
(.1664) 
-.0549   
 (.1298) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SE 
-.0699*   
(.0390) 
-.0810***   
(.0285) 
-.0074   
(.0210) 
.0564*   
(.0318) 
.1273   
(.1271) 
.1035    
(.0805) 
Ownert-1 
.0111**   
(.0043) 
.0064**   
(.0030) 
.0009   
(.0020) 
.0034    
(.0021) 
-.0241**   
(.0116) 
-.0113    
(.0083) 
People jobless 
hht-1 
.0006   
(.0241) 
.0245   
(.0193) 
.0324**   
(.0147) 
.0132   
(.0141) 
-.1481*     
(.0890)  
.1059*    
(.0575) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0079**    
(.0039) 
-.0080**   
(.0040) 
.0066**   
(.0029) 
.0033   
(.0025) 
-.0333**   
(.0151) 
-.0134     
(.0102) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0124   
(.0112) 
-.0158   
(.0100) 
-.0160**   
(.0067) 
-.0072   
(.0067) 
.0980**    
(.0403) 
.0032   
 (.0282) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0130**   
(.0065)     
-.0200***   
(.0051) 
-.0120***   
(.0030) 
-.0113***   
(.0042) 
.1349***   
(.0198) 
.0777***    
(.0135) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.1746***   
(.0319) 
-.0920***   
(.0236) 
-.0337**   
(.0158) 
.0050   
(.0179) 
.3752***   
(.0837) 
.0986    
(.0623) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.1341***   
(.0275) 
-.0452**   
(.0211) 
-.0165   
(.0124) 
.0038   
(.0156) 
.1337*   
(.0774) 
.0332    
(.0545) 
SD 
-.0082   
(.0067) 
-.0075**   
(.0035) 
-.0146***   
(.0030) 
-.0090***   
(.0032) 
.0664***   
(.0178) 
.0445***    
(.0142) 
CC 
-.0100   
(.0107) 
-.0355***   
(.0085) 
-.0318***   
(.0067) 
-.0055   
(.0060) 
.1421***   
(.0323) 
.0341     
(.0221) 
LIB 
-.0266***    
(.0065) 
-.0278***   
(.0048) 
-.0042   
(.0055) 
-.0028   
(.0054) 
.0840***    
(.0229) 
.0212    
(.0180) 
SE 
.0029   
(.0051) 
.0013   
(.0037) 
-.0011   
(.0028) 
-.0064    
(.0041) 
.0072   
(.0160) 
-.0024    
(.0103) 
constant 
-.1157***   
(.0208) 
-.0834***   
(.0171) 
.0379***   
(.0093) 
.1412***   
(.0116) 
.5974***   
(.0631) 
.1040***    
(.0401) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Wald test  
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
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Table 13 - GLS regressions. Social expenditure and institutional systems 
over 2008-2012 
 1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 100
th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
.6930***   
(.2406) 
.7590***   
(.1548) 
.5584***   
(.1705) 
-.4548**   
(.1965) 
-2.7417***   
(.7746) 
-1.3159**   
(.6351) 
Ginit-1 
-.0816***   
(.0107) 
-.0980***   
(.0069) 
-.0586***   
(.0077) 
.0049   
(.0086) 
.4190***   
(.0371) 
.1121***   
 (.0283) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0337**   
(.0148) 
.0081    
(.0117) 
-.0156   
(.0121) 
-.0424***   
(.0108) 
.1657***   
(.0581) 
.0965**     
(.0427) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SD 
-.0074   
(.0315) 
.0036    
(.0145) 
.0444***   
(.0140) 
.0398**   
(.0179) 
-.1748***   
(.0667) 
-.0233    
(.0463) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
CC 
.0348   
(.0237) 
.0330   
(.0210) 
-.0108   
(.0214) 
-.0176   
(.0241) 
.1420   
(.1145) 
.1016    
(.0876) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
LIB 
-.0502*   
(.0269) 
.0243   
(.0282) 
-.0512**   
(.0204) 
-.0279   
(.0326) 
.2680*   
(.1577) 
.0302    
(.1516) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SE 
-.0888***   
(.0245) 
-.0320**   
(.0159) 
-.0312*   
(.0188) 
.0385*    
(.0222) 
.1468*   
(.0769) 
.1245*    
(.0649) 
Ownert-1 
.0084***   
(.0028) 
.0051**   
(.0023) 
-.0013    
(.0023) 
-.0094***   
(.0026) 
.0257**   
(.0110) 
.0162    
(.0099) 
People jobless  
hht-1 
-.0447*   
(.0234) 
-.0342**   
(.0151) 
.0586***   
(.0140) 
.0156   
(.0186) 
-.2763***   
(.0616) 
-.1058**    
(.0531) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0060   
(.0053) 
-.0119***   
(.0035) 
-.0064*   
(.0038)   
.0235***   
(.0054) 
.0115    
(.0160) 
.0221    
(.0138) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0095   
(.0101) 
.0142*   
(.0078) 
-.0140*   
(.0074) 
-.0084    
(.0089) 
.0763**   
(.0358) 
.0077    
(.0285) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0034   
(.0073) 
-.0048   
(.0037) 
-.0020   
(.0034) 
-.0136**   
(.0062) 
.0281*   
(.0157) 
.0068    
(.0151) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.0575***   
(.0203) 
-.0545***   
(.0177) 
-.0424**   
(.0187)    
.0366   
(.0235) 
.1988**   
(.0990) 
.1032    
(.0871) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.0380**   
(.0151) 
-.0098   
(.0120) 
.0046   
(.0114) 
.0334**   
(.0139) 
-.0296   
(.0582) 
-.0498    
(.0476) 
SD 
-.0026   
(.0060) 
.0004   
(.0028) 
-.0083***   
(.0027) 
-.0080**   
(.0034) 
.0383***   
(.0130) 
.0101     
(.0094) 
CC 
-.0089*   
(.0051) 
-.0086**   
(.0043) 
.0006   
(.0043) 
.0040   
(.0050) 
-.0192   
(.0230) 
-.0117    
(.0181) 
LIB 
.0058   
(.0044) 
-.0049    
(.0046) 
.0033   
(.0035) 
.0044   
(.0053) 
-.0189   
(.0260) 
.0075    
(.0245) 
SE 
.0101***   
(.0035) 
.0014   
(.0023) 
.0039   
(.0026) 
-.0051   
(.0033) 
-.0158   
(.0114) 
-.0142     
(.0097) 
constant 
-.0060    
(.0272) 
.0117   
(.0163) 
.0467***   
(.0180) 
.1735***   
(.0216) 
.3347***   
(.0818) 
.1212*    
(.0667) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
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The social expenditure effect is now measured for the different 
types of the EU welfare regimes. 28 On the whole, the data reject 
the hypothesis that the slopes of the several systems are equal. In 
fact, the estimated regressions show that the coefficient of the 
social expenditure may be significantly different from zero and 
hence have a different impact with respect to the excluded 
category.29 
Turning first to Table 12, during the pre-crisis years, social 
expenditure played a positive role in increasing the share of income 
held by the poorest for all the welfare regimes except the Southern 
European system. Indeed, although at a modest significance level, 
the slope of the Southern European system profile is negative. 
Concerning the second decile, only the Conservative-corporatist, 
the Liberal, and the Southern European profiles have an impact at 
considerable significance levels. The slope of the latter, however, 
is negative. As for the median class, only the social expenditure for 
the Social Democratic and Conservative-corporatist regimes has a 
statistically significant and positive impact. Government’s social 
expenditure reduced the share of income held by the upper middle 
class (eighth decile) for all the regimes except the Social 
                                                 
28 The regressions were also run over the 2000-2012 period (Table D.1, Appendix 
D). It can be noticed the positive impact of the social protection expenditure on 
the share of income held by the first and second decile for all the welfare regimes 
except the Southern European system; the positive impact for all the welfare 
regime types, except the Liberal and the Southern European, on the median part of 
the income distribution; the negative effect of the social protection expenditure on 
the eighth decile for the Eastern, Conservative-corporatist, Liberal and Southern 
European systems, and the positive one for the Social Democratic profile. As for 
the top of the income distribution, only the Southern European system has a 
statistically significant and positive impact, whereas the others do not have any 
significant effect. This evidence shows that social expenditure is regressive on 
behalf of the rich among the Southern European countries. It is progressive in the 
other welfare systems, where redistribution is supported by the upper-middle 
class. In the Liberal countries, redistribution is supported also by the median class. 
Finally, it is worth noting that in the Social Democratic countries, social 
protection has a modest but positive impact on the share of income held by the 
eighth decile. 
29 In the specified model, the Eastern countries are the excluded category. 
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Democratic and Southern European systems, whose slopes are 
significantly different from zero and positive. Concerning the top, 
as for the tenth decile, the slope of the Social Democratic, the 
Conservative-corporatist and Liberal profiles are statistically 
significant and negative; as for the hundredth percentile, they all 
are not significantly different from zero except the Social 
Democratic profile. This evidence shows that the social 
expenditure of the Social Democratic, the Conservative-corporatist 
and the Liberal countries is progressive on behalf of the poor 
during the pre-crisis years, whereas the Southern European regime 
is regressive on behalf of the upper-middle class.  
Table 13 shows the estimated regressions run over the 2008-2012 
period. The Social Democratic profile is progressive towards to the 
poor: social expenditure affects positively the share of income held 
by the first decile, the fifth decile and negatively those held by the 
eighth and tenth decile. This is the only group where redistribution 
affects negatively also the tenth decile. However, as for the top 1 
percent, its slope is not statistically different from zero. The 
Conservative-corporatist profile has advantaged the top tail: social 
public expenditure affects positively the share of income held by 
the first decile, negatively that held by the eighth decile and 
positively the share held by the rich (tenth decile and hundredth 
percentile). This means that redistributive policies are supported by 
the upper-middle class. Finally, the slopes of the Liberal and 
Southern European profiles reveal that the social protection 
expenditure is ‘fully’ regressive on behalf of the top tail and to the 
detriment of the poor. In fact, it affects negatively the share of 
income held by the bottom, the median and the upper-middle class, 
whereas it has a positive effect on the share of income of the top tai
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Conclusion 
 
It is theoretically considered that the distribution of income is 
basically shaped by the country’s macroeconomic performance, the 
state of household income inequality and the government’s 
commitment to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor via 
social expenditure policies. This paper shows these are the core 
determinants of the income distribution of the European Union 
countries. This hypothesis was tested using panel data regression 
analysis which assesses their short-term effects on the bottom part 
and the top tail of income distribution. The higher the standard of 
living of a country, the higher the share of income held by the 
poor. The higher the level of income disparity, the greater the 
concentration of income among the rich (upper tail). The higher the 
government’s social expenditure, the higher the share of income 
held by the poor (lower tail). 
Then, the effect of the Great Recession and the related break is 
shown. Specifically, compared to the 2000-2007 period, during the 
crisis years, the macroeconomic performance has lost its equalizing 
effect; the impact on the income distribution of the level of income 
disparity has worsened; the social public expenditure is found to be 
regressive on behalf of the top tail of the distribution. 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, the Great Recession has increased 
the gap between poor households and rich households that are the 
favoured class.  
In terms of the governments’ commitment to reduce this gap via 
social expenditure policies, differences among the different welfare 
regimes of the European Union and over time can be found. In fact, 
social public expenditure is progressive for all the welfare systems 
profiles (where, however, the redistribution is supported by the 
upper-middle class) except the Southern European regime that it is 
regressive on behalf of the top tail and to the detriment of the 
bottom of the income distribution.  
Furthermore, during the crisis years, the public commitment 
towards social expenditure of both the Liberal and Southern 
European regimes has been ‘fully’ regressive.  
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On the whole, after the recent macroeconomic events the public 
commitment in reducing inequality has been ineffective or (worse) 
has increased the gap between less and more favoured households. 
Consequently, this evidence may indicate the direction of the 
appropriate policy measures to control the extent of income 
disparity and the related gap between the poor and the rich, which 
is a declared target for effective cohesion among all the citizens of 
the European Union.  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1 - POLS regressions. General model estimation. Unbalanced sample.  
 
 
1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 
100th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
.5085*   
(.2720) 
.6471***   
(.1663) 
.2538*   
(.1427) 
-.2140***   
(.1492) 
-1.8769***   
(.7003) 
-.8622*    
(.4837) 
Ginit-1 
-.0958***   
(.0125) 
-.1055***   
(.0087) 
-.0753***    
(.0075) 
.0207***   
(.0070) 
.4174***   
(.0370) 
.0912***    
(.0231) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0230    
(.0191) 
.0198**   
(.0095) 
.0148   
(.0097) 
-.0317***   
(.0107) 
.0009 
   (.0486) 
.0251    
(.0331) 
Ownert-1 
.0055   
(.0035) 
.0008   
(.0023) 
.0018   
(.0025) 
-.0065**    
(.0026) 
.0086  
  (.0131) 
.0103   
 (.0091) 
People jobless hht-1 
-.0103   
(.0313) 
-.0090   
(.0184) 
.0120   
(.0179) 
.0097   
(.0228) 
-.0566   
 (.1036) 
.0396    
(.0790) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.00673   
(.0052) 
-.0079**    
(.0031) 
.0043   
(.0034) 
.0211***   
(.0044) 
-.0356**   
(.0166) 
-.0114    
(.0126) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0314**   
(.0156) 
-.0018   
(.0101) 
-.0061   
(.0082) 
-.0028   
(.0115) 
.0541   
 (.0529) 
-.0177     
(.0416) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
.0045   
(.0062) 
.0005   
(.0042) 
-.0112***   
(.0040) 
-.0225***   
(.0053) 
.0731***   
(.0210) 
.0383**   
 (.0151) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.0795***   
(.0282) 
-.0624***   
(.0175) 
-.0286*   
(.0148) 
.0207   
(.0154) 
.1743**    
(.0753) 
.0486    
(.0530) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.0945***   
(.0177) 
-.0459***   
(.0134) 
.0033   
(.0112) 
.0460***     
(.0123) 
.0326   
(.0618) 
-.0309   
 (.0381) 
SD 
-.0043**    
(.0021) 
-.0008   
(.0013) 
-.0000   
(.0011)    
.0003   
(.0012) 
.0056   
 (.0069) 
.0063    
(.0044) 
CC 
.0003   
(.0016) 
-.0020*   
(.0010) 
-.0020**   
(.0009) 
-.0008    
(.0011) 
.0124**   
(.0055) 
.0079**   
 (.0035) 
LIB 
-.0028   
(.0023) 
-.0033**   
(.0016) 
-.0020   
(.0015) 
-.0006   
(.0012) 
.0187**   
(.0078) 
.0136**    
(.0052) 
SE 
-.0019*   
(.0011) 
-.0029***   
(.0008) 
-.0014**   
(.0007) 
-.0006   
(.0007) 
.0126***   
(.0035) 
.0083***   
 (.0023) 
constant 
.0219  
(.0281) 
.0267    
(.0174) 
.0820***   
(.0152) 
.1464***   
(.0164) 
.2406***   
(.0745) 
.0723    
(.0520) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 208 208 208 208 208 197 
F test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.6975 0.8957 0.7686 0.5529 0.8044 0.4017 
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Table B.2 - POLS regressions. General model estimation. Balanced sample. 
 
 
1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8thdecile 10th decile 
100th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
1.0130***   
(.2018) 
1.0878***   
(.1416) 
.4527***   
(.0935) 
-.2753***   
(.1001) 
-3.2510***   
(.4853) 
-1.2039***   
(.2967) 
Ginit-1 
-.0870***   
(.0082) 
-.0981***   
(.0064) 
-.0777***   
(.0053) 
.0149***   
(.0049) 
.4200***   
(.0278) 
.0954***   
(.0139) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0165   
(.0156) 
.0161*   
(.0097) 
.0165**   
(.0076) 
-.0205***   
(.0072) 
-.0221   
(.0389) 
.0043    
(.0216) 
Ownert-1 
.0050*   
(.0029) 
.00040   
(.0022) 
.0018   
(.0019) 
-.0025   
(.0018) 
-.0036   
(.0097) 
-.0015     
(.0053) 
People jobless  
hht-1 
.0017   
(.0238) 
-.0063   
(.0145) 
.0090   
(.0119) 
.0045   
(.0154) 
-.0211   
(.0696) 
.0460    
(.0479)   
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0016   
(.0044) 
-.0028   
(.0033) 
.0037   
(.0029) 
.0142***   
(.0031) 
-.0362**   
(.0147) 
-.0137*    
(.0082) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0354***   
(.0099) 
-.0048   
(.0078) 
-.0056   
(.0058) 
.0023    
(.0076) 
.0445   
(.0362) 
-.0063   
(.0220) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0021   
(.0051) 
-.0047   
(.0035) 
-.0094***   
(.0026) 
-.0168***   
(.0037) 
.0753***   
(.0155) 
.0357***   
(.0105) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.1172***   
(.0200) 
-.0936***   
(.0146) 
-.0493***   
(.0107) 
.0202*   
(.0108) 
.3209***   
(.0540) 
.1361***   
(.0373) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.0847***   
(.0133) 
-.0439***   
(.0103) 
-.0044   
(.0087) 
.0344***    
(.0096) 
.0714   
(.0487) 
.0048    
(.0300) 
SD 
-.0055***   
(.0016) 
-.0023**   
(.0010) 
-.0007   
(.0008) 
.0013   
(.0009) 
.0075   
(.0047) 
.0058*    
(.0030) 
CC 
-.00160   
(.0012) 
-.0038***   
(.0010) 
-.0023***   
(.0006) 
-.0000   
(.0008) 
.0145***   
(.0040) 
.0068***   
(.0024) 
LIB 
-.0052***   
(.0017) 
-.0056***    
(.0013) 
-.0023**   
(.0010) 
.0004   
(.0010) 
.0196***   
(.0055) 
.0131***    
(.0034) 
SE 
-.0028***   
(.0010) 
-.0040***   
(.0007) 
-.0011**   
(.0005) 
.0004   
(.0006) 
.0120***   
(.0028)     
.0067***   
(.0018) 
constant 
-.0273   
(.0213) 
-.0158    
(.0155) 
.0628***   
(.0099) 
.1491***   
(.0108) 
.3797***   
(.0534) 
.1120***   
(.0318) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 324 324 324 324 324 324 
F test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.7231 0.8703 0.8075 0.4883 0.8242 0.4271 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1 - GLS regressions: general model. Unbalanced Sample. 
 
 
1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 
100th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
.7437***   
(.1998) 
.7079***   
(.1347) 
.3721***   
(.1166) 
-.0633   
(.1473) 
-1.8295***   
(.5125) 
-1.0322**   
(.4466) 
Ginit-1 
-.0553***   
(.0087) 
-.0833***   
(.0065) 
-.0686***   
(.0060) 
.0147***   
(.0055) 
.3812***   
(.0318) 
.0585***   
 (.0210) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0632***   
(.0110) 
.0241***   
(.0078) 
.0188**   
(.0084) 
-.0180**   
(.0090) 
-.0468    
(.0438) 
-.0307    
(.0310) 
Ownert-1 
.0116***   
(.0031) 
.0001   
(.0024) 
.0054**   
(.0021) 
-.0031   
(.0025) 
.0092    
(.0097) 
.0018    
(.0079) 
People jobless hht-1 
-.0430**   
(.0207) 
.0019    
(.0141) 
.0032   
(.0140) 
.0029   
(.0161) 
-.0056    
(.0652) 
.1315**   
 (.0581) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0029   
(.0044) 
-.0057*   
(.0031) 
.0046   
(.0032) 
.0239***   
(.0039) 
-.0493***   
(.0156) 
-.0297**   
 (.0126) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0259**   
(.0105) 
-.0102   
(.0075) 
-.0008   
(.0063) 
-.0015   
(.0081) 
.0451    
(.0315) 
-.0460*   
 (.0250) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0013   
(.0078) 
-.0032   
(.0040) 
-.0114***   
(.0037) 
-.0164***   
(.0062) 
.0863***    
(.0162) 
.0601***    
(.0155) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.1024***   
(.0199) 
-.0730***   
(.0176) 
-.0448***   
(.0129) 
.0068  
(.0165) 
.2539***   
(.0652) 
.0892*    
(.0529) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.1023***   
(.0182) 
-.0706***   
(.0125) 
.0000   
(.0095) 
.0315**    
(.0131) 
.0997*   
(.0545) 
-.0184   
 (.0340) 
SD 
-.0047***   
(.0011) 
-.0002   
(.0010)  
-.0010   
(.0009) 
-.0032**   
(.0013) 
.0069   
 (.0051) 
.0097***   
 (.0036) 
CC 
-.0019**   
(.0009) 
-.0021**    
(.0008) 
-.0018**   
(.0008) 
-.0021**   
(.0010) 
.0077**   
(.0038) 
.0091***   
 (.0034) 
LIB 
-.0047***   
(.0015) 
-.0053***   
(.0014) 
-.0019*   
(.0010) 
-.0024**   
(.0011) 
.0200***    
(.0051) 
.0131***   
 (.0039) 
SE 
-.0054***    
(.0014) 
-.0041***   
(.0007) 
-.0014**   
(.0006) 
.0004   
(.0013) 
.0122***   
(.0028) 
.0119***   
 (.0023) 
constant 
-.0106   
(.0223)   
.0204   
(.0144) 
.0658***   
(.0119) 
.1287***   
(.0147) 
.2305***   
(.0512) 
.0954*    
(.0490) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 208 208 208 208 208 197 
Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1 - GLS regressions.  
Social protection expenditure and institutional systems 
 
 
1st decile 2nd decile 5th decile 8th decile 10th decile 
100th 
percentile 
GDP per headt-1 
1.3495***   
(.1689) 
1.2770***   
(.1226) 
.6168***   
(.0969) 
-.1996*    
(.1148) 
-4.1464***   
(.5550) 
-1.4282***   
(.3558) 
Ginit-1 
-.0378***   
(.0082) 
-.0542***   
(.0059) 
-.0603***   
(.0048) 
.0176***   
(.0046) 
.3192***   
(.0283) 
.0420**   
(.0175) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1 
.0553***   
(.0140) 
.0328***    
(.0116) 
.0219**   
(.0100) 
-.0300***   
(.0092) 
-.0733   
(.0592)   
-.0128    
(.0378) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SD 
.0156   
(.0257) 
.0031   
(.0129) 
.0340***   
(.0125) 
.0356**    
(.0144) 
-.0602   
(.0712) 
-.0475    
(.0509) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
CC 
.0173   
(.0272) 
.0460*    
(.0237) 
.0503**   
(.0230) 
-.0041   
(.0217) 
-.1488   
(.1241) 
.1237    
(.0773) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
LIB 
.0246   
(.0258) 
.0639***    
(.0210) 
-.0608***   
(.0233) 
.0005   
(.0246) 
.1340   
(.1010) 
.0010   
 (.0880) 
Social Protection 
Expenditure t-1* 
SE 
-.0930***   
(.0232) 
-.0519***   
(.0173) 
-.0376***   
(.0145) 
.0175   
(.0200)  
.2644***   
(.0809) 
.1359***   
(.0495) 
Ownert-1 
.0094***   
(.0031) 
.0050**   
(.0023) 
.0016   
(.0018) 
-.0047**   
(.0020) 
.0039    
(.0098) 
.0010   
 (.0069) 
People jobless 
hht-1 
-.0402**   
(.0196) 
-.0098   
(.0139) 
.0293**   
(.0120) 
.0238**   
(.0120) 
-.1968***   
(.0685) 
.0270  
  (.0469) 
Tertiary 
Educationt-1 
-.0060   
(.0044) 
-.0086**   
(.0034) 
.0015   
(.0029) 
.0061**   
(.0026) 
-.0134   
(.0161) 
-.0053   
 (.0106) 
Unemploymentt-1 
-.0139   
(.0095) 
-.0115   
(.0075) 
-.0122**    
(.0059) 
-.0043   
(.0065) 
.1194***   
(.0339) 
.0022    
(.0227) 
Female 
Employmentt-1 
-.0119**    
(.0057) 
-.0146***   
(.0036) 
-.0096***   
(.0026) 
-.0063   
(.0040) 
.0747***   
(.0158) 
.0477***   
(.0109) 
Financial 
Activities 
Employeest-1 
-.1318***   
(.0204) 
-.0926***   
(.0165) 
-.0425***   
(.0130) 
.0112   
(.0179) 
.3246***   
(.0738) 
.2167***   
(.0584) 
Elderly peoplet-1 
-.0744***    
(.0184) 
-.0451***   
(.0133) 
-.0001   
(.0102) 
.0086   
(.0131) 
.0805   
(.0559) 
.0511   
(.0381) 
SD 
-.0078   
(.0050) 
-.0022    
(.0026) 
-.0086***   
(.0024) 
-.0065**   
(.0027) 
.0280**   
(.0136) 
.0158*    
(.0095) 
CC 
-.0077   
(.0057) 
-.0150***   
(.0049) 
-.0139***   
(.0047) 
.0015   
(.0045) 
.0527**   
(.0255) 
-.0198    
(.0159) 
LIB 
-.0099**   
(.0041) 
-.0167***   
(.0033) 
.0046    
(.0037) 
-.0006   
(.0036) 
.0135   
(.0155) 
.0139     
(.0132) 
SE 
.0073**   
(.0033) 
.0001   
(.0025) 
.0037*   
(.0020) 
-.0012   
(.0028) 
-.0225*   
(.0115) 
-.0118    
(.0074) 
constant 
-.0742***    
(.0184) 
-.0431***   
(.0131) 
.0403***   
(.0099) 
.1429***   
(.0124) 
.4959***   
(.0586) 
.1281***   
(.0371) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Nr. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
N 324 324 324 324 324 324 
Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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